By Richard M. Scheffler, Daniel R. Arnold, Surina Khurana, and Brent D. Fulton | Published July 9, 2020 | Link to Report
California Governor Gavin Newsom issued an executive order on March 19, 2020 that effectively prevented hospitals from performing elective procedures to free capacity for a possible surge of COVID-19 patients (order lifted on April 22, 2020). This report examines the financial status of the largest health systems in California, with a particular focus on their liquid assets for financial solvency. It then reports the amount they have received in CARES Act provider relief payments. Overall, 24% of the estimated reduction in net patient revenue was offset by direct CARES Act grants, but the offset varied widely by hospital. The report then presents the correlation between provider relief payments and a hospital’s private insurance share of patient revenue, operating margin, and the hospital market concentration of the county in which it resides. We find hospitals with a larger share of net patient revenue from private insurers and hospitals residing in highly concentrated hospital markets received larger payments per adjusted patient day. The results suggest that careful monitoring of future relief payments is needed.
By Richard M. Scheffler, Daniel R. Arnold, Brent D. Fulton, Alexandra Peltz, Taylor L. Wang, and John Swartzberg | Published June 25, 2020 | Link to Report
Based on recent antibody studies that report about a 5% prevalence in California, we estimate the health care costs of treating coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) to be $2.4 billion in California — six times the annual cost of influenza in the state. Costs vary dramatically across counties due to significant differences in population size, health care prices, and payer mix. Estimated costs are $617 million in Los Angeles, $64 million in San Francisco, and $204 million in San Diego. The cost per infected person is $1,326, $1,774, $289, and $629 for commercial, Medicare, Medi-Cal/CHIP, and uninsured enrollees, respectively. We also calculate the costs under scenarios of 15%, 30% and 60% prevalence — the latter being a lower threshold of the prevalence generally assumed to be needed before herd immunity is achieved. Our costing model will be updated as new information about the prevalence and health care utilization and costs are reported for California.
By the Staff of the Nicholas C. Petris Center | Published April 2005 by the Petris Center | Link to Full Report
While hospital closures have generated a great deal of media attention and community concern, hospitals have other possible responses to the difficult financial environment. This report focuses on one such response. Are hospitals changing their inpatient service offerings in order to improve their financial health? This study is a systematic look at the changes in services offered by California hospitals from 1995 to the 2002. It shows that over the study period there were several significant shifts in service patterns. This report documents these changes and provides a systematic exploration of the possible explanations for what has happened in California’s hospital system.
By the Nicholas C. Petris Center | Published in April 2001 by the Petris Center | Link to Full Report
In October 2000, The Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer Welfare, a research organization at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Public Health, took on the job of creating a taxonomical list of all general acute care hospitals in California that closed between 1995 and 2000. Thus, we have put together the only effort that we know of to collect and synthesize standardized information about the California hospitals that closed in the second half of the 1990s. For the first time, we can now document and describe the 23 general acute care (GAC) hospitals that closed, 11 of which took place at for-profit facilities. The vast majority took place in urban areas, and they were most often in southern California. More than half of the closed hospitals had fewer than 100 licensed beds. Ten of the closed hospitals had changed ownership within three years prior to their closure. All the closed hospitals claimed, and demonstrated, financial distress prior to closing.